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CHAPTER 3 
ATTENDING TO 
PHENOMENOLOGY: 
RETHINKING COGNITION 
AND REFLECTION IN NORTH 
AMERICAN WRITING STUDIES
Dylan B. Dryer
University of Maine
David R. Russell
Iowa State University
As detailed elsewhere in this collection (esp. Bazerman; Carillo; Talbot), when 
North American Writing Studies of higher education and workplaces (hence-
forth, NAWS) turned to European continental philosophies, it turned away 
from information-processing (IP) cognitive theories. Those theories were early 
casualties of this “social-turn” (e.g., Bartholomae, 1985; Bizzell, 1982; Brand, 
1987); today, NAWS seems somewhat squeamish about the fact that the brain 
is an organ with a broadly generalizable structure, predictable development, ca-
pacity constraints, operating costs, and so on. Yet cognitive research is a dynamic 
and thriving field that does not much resemble the after-image that persists 
in NAWS. Some of these changes in cognitive research have been driven by 
high-profile advances in laboratory methods, such as functional Magnetic Res-
onance Imaging (which monitors intensities of blood-flow as a proxy measure 
for specific areas of the brain that are engaged by a task), but other changes have 
been conceptual and thus largely invisible to NAWS.
To make these changes more visible, we first emphasize that NAWS and cog-
nitive research on writing have both suffered from their estrangement. Second, 
we describe one of the most significant of these conceptual shifts: namely, re-
search in phenomenology and neuro-phenomenology, which challenges IP cog-
nitive constructs by positing embodied and enactive theories of neural function-
ing that are based on biological rather than cybernetic machine models. As will 
be seen, this research also challenges notions of “reflection” as currently valorized 
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in NAWS. Third, we indicate how reconceiving reflection phenomenologically 
could help both NAWS and cognitive research on writing. Finally, we describe 
the pedagogical and curricular implications of phenomenological reflection for 
faculty seeking to responsibly operationalize national consensus documents like 
the WPA Outcomes Statement for First-Year Composition.
THE STATE OF THE FIELDS
Dueling caricatures hamper effective collaboration between NAWS and cogni-
tive research. To transcend these caricatures, two points must be acknowledged: 
first, John R. Hayes was fair in saying that English departments (the institutional 
homes of most NAWS scholars) have an “unfortunate tendency to faddishness” 
(1996, p. 12). Yet these departments’ discomfort was not just au courant mistrust 
of empiricism (Berkenkotter, 1989; Charney, 1996); NAWS was wary that a sci-
entifically or pseudo-scientifically grounded determinism would explain away 
(or even attempt to erase) the socially produced differences among writers from 
different backgrounds that the field was learning to understand as motivated. At 
this point, NAWS has used poststructuralist critiques of linguistic transparency, 
substitutability, presence, and innocuity to investigate nearly every conceivable 
configuration of writer-identity, writer-task, writer-context, and writer-history. 
NAWS’ sensitivity to the interpersonal, intertextual, intergeneric, and inter-situ-
ational complexities of writing events are at an extraordinary pitch. For instance, 
it is not typical in mainstream NAWS research (as it still is in cognitive research 
in the Hayes tradition) to speak of “writing ability,” “writing quality,” “the writ-
ing process” or “the writer” in any general sense. That is, decades of solid work 
uncovering the influences of genre and technological affordance on compos-
ing processes, the complications of language identity and inheritance in school 
(Berkenkotter, Huckin, & Ackerman, 1988; Brodkey, 1994; Casanave, 1992) 
and workplace (Paré, 2002) composing tasks, and the complexities involved in 
any attempt to transfer writing practices among different contexts, have made 
such generalizations unsustainable.
However, having determined that writing is not simply an “in-head phenom-
enon” (Rowe, 2008, p. 410) NAWS hypercorrected by equating the sociality of 
writing with complete context-dependency (Blythe, 2016). For all its sensitivity 
to the contextual, NAWS seldom acknowledges the materiality and structure 
of the brain, closing itself off from developments in the cognitive sciences that 
might have usefully informed its deepening commitment to the cultivation of 
“reflective” writers. Anthologies or handbooks designed to introduce graduate 
students (e.g., Matsuda & Ritter, 2010; Vandenberg et al., 2006; Villanueva & 
Arola, 2011) or undergraduates (e.g., Downs & Wardle, 2014; Kinkead 2016) 
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to NAWS seldom acknowledge cognitive research after the 1980s (but see Mill-
er, 2009, pp. 1032-1048); in fact, we observe that even in this collection, ref-
erences to Flower and Hayes (1981) and earlier abound, but no mention of 
Hayes’ work since. NAWS has allowed itself to stop paying attention once “our” 
colleague left the partnership.
But cognitive science has continued to find writing an interestingly complex 
activity to study. Hayes, for one, is still at work refining construct-models of 
writing. In two substantial revisions (1996; 2012) to the model he and Flower 
advanced in 1980, Hayes integrated feedback loops to show that motivation, 
affect, and dispositions influence working and long-term memory and cogni-
tive processes (1996, p. 4, Figure 1.3). Later he incorporated more prominent 
and specific roles for “task environment,” including “transcribing technology” 
and “task materials” (2011, p. 371, Figure 2). These developments are entirely 
consistent with and could yet enrich the social-turn developments described 
above. For example, the construct of a limited “working memory” as a struc-
tural constraint for writers at early age or diminished experience levels retains 
considerable explanatory power for phenomena like the predictable lower-level 
skill-regression writers experience when encountering a new kind of composing 
task or composing technology.
Some traditions of inquiry not concerned with process modeling (i.e., those 
that test theories by manipulating variables like task-sequence, composing tool, 
or environmental condition) are oriented toward diagnostic and therapeutic 
agendas—isolating particular subroutines or brain functions, differentiating 
among types of learners and/or their abilities, impairments, difficulties, language 
affiliations or developmental stage. But others parallel recent interest in NAWS 
on motivation, intention, self-efficacy, and self-regulation—capacities that po-
tentially bear on reflection. Barry J. Zimmerman and Rafael Risemberg (1997), 
whose names are usually associated with this tradition of research in cognition, 
appear to have arrived independently at the much greater weight Hayes assigned 
to “physical environment” and “social environment” a year earlier (1996, p. 
4, Figure 1.3). As they find, “[m]otivational processes such as perceptions of 
self-efficacy and positive self-reactions during learning are as essential to set-
ting effective writing goals and sustained achievement as cognitive measures of 
writing competence” (1997, p. 76). In a recent metastudy, Tanya Santangelo, 
Karen Harris, and Steve Graham (2016) confirm that explicit teaching of at 
least five of the ten self-regulation strategies that Zimmerman and Risemberg 
hypothesized—including approaches already widely endorsed in NAWS, such 
as prewriting to brainstorm and organize ideas—consistently produce positive 
measurable effects on the quality of student writing. Yet NAWS has been slow 
to take up empirical research in social and affective dimensions of cognition 
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that might have helped it perceive and address development of writing abilities 
among its client populations (or even to help it better understand the causality 
behind certain practices it has long endorsed).
The second point that must be acknowledged is that much cognitive re-
search on writing operates with impoverished constructs for text products. For 
instance, it is still common to find a measure of “text quality” designed as the 
dependent variable of interest, but no description of the specific traits that judg-
es (also rarely identified) evaluated, or with what kind of scale. We know of 
only two studies that attempt to account for the effect of genre on any measure 
of text quality (Beauvais, Favart, Passerault, & Beauvais, 2014; Olive, Favart, 
Beauvais, & Beauvais, 2009). Revision remains predominantly locked in the 
stage-process paradigm (e.g., generation-production-review) that Flower and 
Hayes problematized 35 years ago, and editing remains conflated with “mistake 
detection” (e.g., Kellogg, 1996). Moreover, extrapolations from clinical/labo-
ratory composing contexts are vulnerable to empirical challenge from NAWS’ 
critical-cultural tradition. It seems unlikely, for instance, that the self-regulation 
strategies of a young woman of color whose schooling has trained her to distrust 
and demean the sound of her own “voice” will much resemble those of “Lynn” 
(Emig, 1971) or Flower and Hayes’ “Seventeen magazine writer.” Learning-dis-
abled writers have been a consistent focus, but contemporary cognitive mod-
els have no way yet to account for influences like cultural trauma (Cushman, 
2011), postcolonial composing contexts (Giltrow, 2003), or identity conflicts 
like stereotype threat (Schmader & Johns, 2003) and anxieties about assimila-
tion (Ivanič, 1998). We share enthusiasm for the newly unobtrusive and afford-
able software applications that pair keystroke-logging, screen-capture data and 
even eye-movement, since such applications have begun to show us real-time 
enactment of the self-monitoring and resource-management strategies hypoth-
esized in the late twentieth century. However, the conclusion of Huub van den 
Bergh, Gert Rijlaarsdam, and Elke van Steendam (2016) that at “different points 
in the writing process, different cognitive activities dominate the configuration” 
(p. 58) should remind us that the cognitive processes we can capture with these 
applications are responsive to environmental conditions such as genre, timing, 
history with task, and so on (Yancey, this volume, might call these effects the 
existence of “the prior” in the lab; Taczak and Robertson, “historical baggage”).
Thus we find contradictions: while it continues to be an article of faith in the 
cognitive sciences that “efficiency” and “automaticity” of mental processes are 
universally desired ends (Flower & Hayes, 1980, p. 25; Kellogg & Whiteford, 
2009, p. 251; Kellogg et al., 2013, pp. 162-163), NAWS seems determined to 
slow down and disrupt these processes (Cooper, 2011, p. 441; Mays & Jung, 
2012, p. 55; Reiff & Bawarshi, 2011, pp. 331-332) to trigger metacognition and 
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critical engagement. Meanwhile, its obliviousness to contemporary cognitive 
approaches to writing notwithstanding, mainstream NAWS remains ironically 
cognitivist in its current priorities, investing considerable pedagogical and cur-
ricular energies in “critical thinking,” “genre awareness,” “metacognition,” and 
“reflection.” In other words, NAWS wants to change the way we think about 
writing and help people understand how writing makes us think, but is not 
much interested in the specific mechanisms by which that thinking gets done. 
The unfortunate effects of this “crypto-cognitivism” are 1) that NAWS seldom 
informs these aims of critical thinking or reflection with what’s known about 
motivation or self-regulation and 2) even now finds itself having to remind those 
attempting to incorporate reflection in their writing classrooms that reflective 
writing itself must be taught, practiced, and developed over time (Sommers, 
2011; Ihara, 2014; Yancey, Roberston, & Taczak, 2014, p. 4).
PHENOMENOLOGY AND REFLECTION
It is ironic that when composition “left” cognitive theories to IP cognitive psy-
chology in the late 1980s, it left them for continental philosophy firmly in the 
tradition we emphasize here: the phenomenological tradition most closely asso-
ciated with Maurice Merleau-Ponty (2014). Known as “the philosopher of the 
body,” Merleau-Ponty’s work has been a consistent, if largely unremarked, influ-
ence on NAWS. Unlike many of his students (Foucault and Bourdieu among 
them), he emphasized the positive aspects of agency—the existential human 
freedom of the subject. It is this version of continental theory that is gaining 
influence in cognitive science (Gallagher, 2012), providing an alternative to IP 
models in a way that is strikingly consistent with the expansive cultural-histori-
cal and embodied approaches to theorizing writing now in favor in NAWS itself. 
(For another alternative to the IP tradition, see Kristie Fleckenstein’s provocative 
formulation of an “eco-cognitive” methodological orientation for NAWS (2012, 
pp. 86-97).)
In this section, we sketch a model of reflection that is on the one hand con-
sistent with what we have learned from the last 35 years of social inquiry into 
composing processes and on the other hand, could contribute to a more robust 
construct of “writing” for cognitive research. NAWS currently sees reflection 
as a means to many ends: to help facilitate transfer, to help students avoid un-
knowing entrapment in dominant discourses; to preserve and respect linguistic 
difference; and, perhaps most frequently, as a means of assessing growth as a 
writer. To be sure, reflective writing as an institutional phenomenon—and in 
particular as an assessment phenomenon—has come under ideological critique 
from the perspective of ethics (Conway, 1994); genre (Bower, 2003; Emmons, 
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2003) and subjectivity (Jung, 2011; Scott, 2005). We raise a different question 
here: less ideology than feasibility. Barbara Tomlinson (1984) raised still-unset-
tled questions about the limitations of what she called “retrospective accounts” 
of composing, and phenomenological cognitive research since then suggests that 
reflection is more of a post-hoc by-product of unconscious decision-making 
than a deliberative prelude to it (Freeman 2000; Kahneman, 2003). As such, we 
need to attend to work in cognition that suggests significant operational con-
straints on our ability to reflect, especially in contexts like compulsory writing 
classes. Put another way, we need a way to describe the cognition in reflection, 
and the phenomenological tradition can help us do this.
Marilyn Cooper (2011) redefines agency as “the process through which 
organisms create meanings through acting into the world and changing their 
structure in response to the perceived consequences of their actions,” whether 
conscious or nonconscious (p. 426). Drawing on neurological research on what 
is termed “prereflective awareness,” she explains that “we do not experience our 
intentions as causing our bodily movements,” but we nevertheless can attribute 
the actions to our “own” agency (2011, p. 434). This reframing, we suggest, can 
be extended to reflection. The first principle is that there is a first-order pre- 
(or non-) reflective self-awareness, “primordial feelings,” in Antonio Damasio’s 
(2012) account, which result from nothing but the living body and precede any 
interaction between the machinery of life regulation and any object. Primordial 
feelings are based on the operation of upper-brain-stem nuclei, which are part 
and parcel of the life-regulation machinery. Primordial feelings are the primitives 
for all other feelings. (Damasio, 2012, p. 108)
A second-order, “reflective self ” as Damasio calls it, is the narrative or auto-
biographical self, the self that takes into consideration past and future, planning 
and imagining, or in Damasio’s words again, “the kind of consciousness illustrat-
ed by novels, films, and music and celebrated by philosophical reflection” (2012, 
p. 168). This “self ” is what brain research has largely studied, in part because it 
is the most fully human self (we share primordial feelings with all animals), but 
also because the areas of the brain implicated in these activities are closest to the 
skull, where electrodes can monitor them most easily. But mounting research 
shows that the reflective self is not a separate add-on feature, but grows out of 
and is fully integrated with first-order self-awareness. The second is built on the 
first and cannot function without it. Each affects the other dynamically. As Sean 
Gallagher (2012) points out, this pre-reflective self-awareness “also includes a 
sense of agency—a sense that I am in control of my actions.” We never ask, 
“someone is thinking this, who is it?” (Gallagher, 2012, p. 132).
Although the conscious reflective self sometimes overrides the non-conscious 
processing of meanings (Cooper’s term) or images (Damasio’s term), conscious 
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reflection is seldom required for decisions nor is it typically the end-result of a 
sequence of conscious reasoning (though people can and do justify unconscious 
choices with retrospective reasoning [Kahneman, 2003; Lehrer, 2010]). Simi-
larly, people are capable of a great deal of learning without conscious reflection 
on it. We need only engage in skillful coping, where “acting is experienced as a 
steady flow of skillful activity in response to one’s sense of the situation” (Drey-
fus, 2005, p. 378). In skillful coping, we focus on the intentional object (the 
chessboard, the road ahead, achieving the goal of the writing task), not our 
bodily movements or our process of reasoning or our cognitive states—unless 
there is an interruption, a breakdown, a need to consciously reflect. This “feed-
back loop between the learner and the perceived world” (Dreyfus, 2005 p. 132) 
is what Merleau-Ponty calls “the intentional arc,” and one monitors—always 
unconsciously but sometimes also consciously—one’s movement along this arc. 
This is what Merleau-Ponty (in Dreyfus’ 2005 formulation) describes as “next 
step” monitoring of progress. In order to act, we do not need to have a final 
goal “in mind” or a mental representation of the action. We only need to move, 
in a way motivated by our sense of direction, and monitor whether that move-
ment seems to feel as if we’re going in the right direction, in coordination with 
others (though not in lockstep imitation or even agreement). It is not a matter 
of matching behavior to a goal, but weighing whether and how much one’s be-
havior moves one along one’s “intentional arc.” It is only novices or those with 
cognitive impairments who must reflect on their process in order to accomplish 
it—who “need to think about” engaging the clutch in driving, or forming letters 
and words.
This “ideomotor” theory rejects the separation of perception and action. Hu-
mans, like animals, have what William James theorized as “common coding” 
(Prinz, 1990). We perceive and respond integrally as we engage with the world 
(Downey, 2010), or as Merleau-Ponty puts it, we are “geared” to the world. 
Recent research on imitation shows that much of our action and learning (de-
velopment of habits of engagement with the world) is based not on stepwise or 
algorithmic processes, on the model of a computer, but rather on imitation, mi-
mesis. Neurobiology has provided much support for this view with the discovery 
in the 1990s of “mirror neurons,” which are engaged both when we perform an 
action and when we see it being performed (see Remley; Talbot, this volume). 
IP cognitive theory’s postulation (Fodor, 1975) of “a language of thought” that 
intervenes between perception and action through a separate level of mental 
representations proves unnecessary. In the phenomenological view, what the IP 
tradition would consider “task definition” would be called “perception”—a more 
foundational construct than language or thought. We perceive the world in or-
der to respond to it, in writing as in any other way. But, crucially, we respond to 
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the world in order to perceive it. Perception, such as our perception of situations 
that might require writing (exigence or genre perception), has an intentional arc 
set against a background of motivated action. And those motives, that direction, 
are always already social. Any definition of task includes the cultural frames of 
reference by which we come to understand certain things (and not others) as 
tasks to be defined (this was Bartholomae’s influential critique (1985)), as well 
as our own near and distant histories with the language, relevant genres, and 
seemingly similar contexts laminated into our responses.
This conflation of perception and action does not mean that conscious reflec-
tion has no role in mimetic learning. As Greg Downey (2010) points out, even 
in forms of physical education (e.g., sports, dance) teachers/coaches “scaffold” 
students’ imitation with sophisticated techniques that draw students’ conscious 
attention to mimesis, and the same might be said of musical performance, touch 
typing, or writing (as in the complex mimesis that is paraphrase). What it does 
mean is that learning to perform some action—including writing—is always a 
combination of conscious and nonconscious learning, and that the substantial 
roles played by proximity to others, shared tools and physical contexts, affec-
tive states, etc., in this learning are largely unavailable for detached scrutiny—at 
least not without years of training in such detachment. We need not decompose 
analytically and reflect on each component of performance to learn to perform, 
even at the initial stages of learning. We only have to have a sense of the next 
step, within the horizon of attention both before and behind us.
As Alfred North Whitehead (1920) posited nearly a century ago, “what we 
perceive as present is the vivid fringe of memory tinged with anticipation” (p. 
73). In this light, when van den Bergh et al. (2016) concede that the precise na-
ture, location and function of what has been variously called the “monitor,” the 
“central executive,” and the “control level” (p. 68)—that is, the “master” cogni-
tive function that apportions attentional resources to specific subroutines—have 
been quite difficult to pin down, we could respond in two ways. We could con-
clude that this difficulty indicates gaps in existing models that need filling, or 
we could conclude that what’s needed is a more expansive operating construct 
of “consciousness.”
REFLECTION, COGNITION AND COMPOSITION: A 
NEUROPHENOMENOLOGICAL CONVERGENCE
Having sketched a phenomenological account of reflection to complement Coo-
per’s (2011) account of agency, we disaggregate several different understandings 
of reflection (though often used interchangeably) from two that emerge from 
phenomenology. We can start with dictionary definitions: reflection as serious 
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thought, consideration, or deliberation—serious in the sense of an atypically 
systematic or analytic approach to a problem. This remains the definition that 
obtains in machine modeling, as suggested by the formal “cogitation” or “cog-
nition” on problem-solving (Flower & Hayes, 1977). It is also worth noting 
the literature on embodied decision-making from studies of neural responses to 
economic choices (Kahneman, 2003; Lehrer, 2010), and a budding field of neu-
ro-rhetoric. Both fields point strongly to the pre-conscious and emotive bases 
of decision-making, and the retrospective dimensions of conscious deliberation.
These understandings we distinguish from “critical reflection,” which has a 
long history in educational theory and research, especially in teacher education, 
and which originates from John Dewey’s (1993) view of teachers (and students) 
as agents of progressive change in schools and society. To do so they must be, 
Dewey wrote, open-minded, responsible, and wholehearted (that is, courageous 
and persistent in the face of adversity). A long tradition of theorizing various 
stages or levels or kinds of reflection is summarized by Deborah Yost, Sally M. 
Sentner, and Anna Forlenza-Bailey (2000). Much of composition’s view of crit-
ical reflection lies in this tradition, whether explicitly acknowledged or not, in 
terms of its value for transfer, for social consciousness and critique, and so on. 
But it is important to note that composing reflections has been especially import-
ant here as a key pedagogical technique in teacher education. This technique 
is also frequently applied in professional education; in business and technical 
communication, for instance, students in internships are assumed to develop 
professional skill and identity through reflective writing. This assumption was 
theorized in a very influential way by Donald Schön in the 1980s, and his for-
mulation of the “reflective practitioner” (1987) has guided theory and research 
not only in professional education but also in management and organizational 
communication, where it has been expanded beyond the individual to a plural 
“reflective organization” (Gray, 2007).
A fourth understanding, metacognition or “thinking about thinking,” has 
been substantially investigated in psychology departments, some of which 
comes from IP cognitive psychology, some from different traditions. Closely re-
lated to this is a two-decade-old tradition of research on “social metacognition,” 
which is pursued in social psychology, especially branches influenced by cogni-
tive psychology. This research examines people’s “complex determinations about 
the reliability of our own thoughts, feelings, and beliefs as well as attributions 
about the thoughts, feelings, and beliefs of others around us” (Jost, Kruglanski, 
& Nelson, 1998, p. 137). Several lines of inquiry here speak to issues that have 
become recently visible in composition research: people’s thoughts about their 
past and future in personal development; people’s formation of cultural atti-
tudes; the formation and reformation of stereotypes, prejudice, and bias; as well 
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as issues important to professional communication and cultural theory, such as 
metacognition in teams and organizations, and in consumer choice (Briñol & 
DeMarree, 2012).
Those four ways of conceptualizing “reflection” are instructive to compare 
with two distinctly different understandings of reflection that emerge from phe-
nomenological traditions: mindfulness and neurophenomenology. The first, cul-
tivation of contemplation, meditation, or mindfulness in writing, dates back 
almost to the founding of the field. Sondra Perl published “Understanding 
Composing,” an alternative theory of the writing process based on the work 
of Eugene Gendlin (1982), a humanist psychologist and philosopher who was 
an important U.S. exponent of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the body. 
Perl (1980) adapted Gendlin’s therapeutic techniques of body awareness to an-
alyzing what we would call today the socio-cognitive processes of writing. In 
that same decade, James Moffett explored yoga as a pedagogy (1982), and Peter 
Elbow (1989) investigated the phenomenology of freewriting. Perl took up this 
work again in 2004 with Felt Sense, writing exercises based on the principle of 
phenomenological bracketing, of becoming aware of one’s intentional arc and 
monitoring one’s feelings to know—or rather feel—what the next step is. Again, 
reflection is not something that is set apart in time or space from the writing 
processes. It is integrated, moment by moment, into the process (e.g., van Ma-
nen, 1990). Contemplative practices such as mindfulness and yoga have begun 
to be developed and studied empirically (both qualitatively and quantitatively) 
in a number of fields, most notably Mathematics and Physical Education and a 
pedagogical literature has begun developing in NAWS (Rifenburg, 2014; Walk-
er, 2015; Wenger, 2015).
Neurophenomenology, however, comes from the legacy of Alexander Luria, 
the greatest of Vygotsky’s collaborators. As he and his colleagues put it, “to un-
derstand the brain foundations for psychological activity, one must be prepared 
to study both the brain and the system of activity” (Luria et al., 1979, p. 173). 
Psychologists pursuing this legacy have used introspective methods, including 
phenomenology, to understand the structure of the neural system. They have 
used phenomenological description—the description of one’s own mental phe-
nomena “bracketed off” from immediate action—in conjunction with neural 
imaging to produce “neuro-phenomenology,” a term coined in the mid-1990s 
by the Chilean cognitive neuroscientist Francisco Varela (1996). The goal of 
neurophenomenology is to use first-person phenomenological description to 
expand and enrich third person accounts drawn from the experimental meth-
ods of neuroscience and vice versa (Gallagher, 2012, pp. 36-37, 107-108). The 
classic study is of Nepalese monks who reported that their meditation practice 
increased their “clarity” (see Thompson, 2007). Neuroscientists intrigued by the 
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monks’ first-person reports attached electrodes and measured their brain activity 
(third-person scientific description), while at the same time asking them to rank 
their feelings of clarity on a Likert scale before, during, and after the episodes 
of meditation where they reported “clarity” (first-person phenomenological de-
scription). Novice monks formed a control group. Experienced monks’ ratings 
of “clarity” corresponded with increases in high amplitude gamma synchrony as 
compared with the novices. Thompson points out that not only do the self-re-
ports show these things are “really going on,” but without the phenomenological 
self-report data, the changes in gamma synchrony would just be “noise” in the 
data to the neuroscientists. Further, the bridging of first and third person per-
spectives shows that cultural differences in the ways people live their lives (in 
this case highly trained mental states) involve specific neural/somatic differences. 
Similar neurophenomenological studies have been undertaken in a range of ar-
eas, most notably pain management.
In this view, the brain is not best understood, in Marvin Minsky’s words, as 
a “computer made out of meat,” manipulating internal symbols in order to solve 
exterior problems out in the world (as cited in Hall, 2013, p. 22). Where ma-
chine/computer models understand writing as the transcription of inner speech 
or thought into external inscription, emerging models of cognition are biolog-
ical, understanding cognition as an attribute of all animals—only developed in 
humans to the point that they are capable of that kind of tool-use known as writ-
ing. As Rafael Núñez, Laurie Edwards, and João Filipe Matos (1999) describe 
this paradigm in their seminal discussion of embodied cognition in mathematics 
education: “cognition is about enacting or bringing forth adaptive and effective 
behavior, not about acquiring information or representing objects in an external 
world” (p. 49, emphasis added). The concept of “adaptation” is also crucial to 
Cooper’s reframing of rhetorical agency, discussed above, which—not coinci-
dentally—also draws on neurophenomenological research (2011, pp. 426-427).
Neurophenomenology may provide a new way of looking at reflection in 
writing and on writing, both as a method of research investigation and, perhaps, 
as a method of improving writing processes (although it should be acknowl-
edged that as of this writing, most of these studies examine effects at the level of 
word-choice or sentence-revision tasks on very specific populations, which limits 
their usefulness for broad theorizing (e.g., dysgraphics or dyslexics v. “normal” 
writers or readers; writers of alphabets v. ideograms, and so on). This limitation 
reflects the need for feasibly controllable study-design, although it also reflects 
assumptions in the cognitive sciences about what “writing” is. We await studies 
over a longer timespan with the same group of writers, which might help us 
monitor developing genre knowledge as evidenced by increasingly efficient or-
chestration routines in the brain. We also imagine that traditional methods such 
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as document-based interviews, screencasting, probes during writing, etc. might 
be combined with clinical methods of brain imaging to address questions of how 
structures of attention (viz., short-term memory) are managed with and with-
out conscious reflection, how anxiety is managed, with implications for writer’s 
block, how multi-modal genre features are perceived and managed, among a 
range of other presssing topics.
This quick survey of approaches to “reflection” in NAWS is intended to show 
the wide range of understandings of reflection in the field, to point up the need 
for greater clarity in discussions of reflection in writing, and to suggest that (neu-
ro)phenomenology may offer an account of it that is compatible with but goes 
beyond IP accounts. Moreover, neurophenomenology and embodied cognition 
can be seen as picking up phenomenological strands of writing processes theory 
and pedagogy that have been part of NAWS just as long as IP cognitive writing 
process theory has, though far less developed as an empirical research program. 
What is clear is that the complex cognitive activities that NAWS calls “reflec-
tion” involve socially and historically distributed mental processes, are neces-
sarily diffuse and ill-defined, and even when these processes are most deliberate 
and purposeful, they are applied to a (re)construction of equally diffuse and 
ill-defined moments in a writer’s past. NAWS is beginning to acknowledge that 
“reflection” is not usefully understood as a final step in “the” writing process. 
The elaborate scaffolding for thinking-about-thinking or thinking-about-feel-
ing some contributors describe elsewhere in this collection (e.g., Khost; Reid; 
Winslow & Shaw) are one way to glimpse the significant obstacles to reflection in 
the short-term physical and social environment of a compulsory class on “writ-
ing”—relative, to make a pointed comparison, to the physical and social con-
texts in which the Nepalese monk-adepts achieved their states of “clarity” (see 
also Mays & Jung, 2012, p. 55).
IMPLICATIONS
If the mind is a function of the body’s (including the brain) material engagement 
with the rest of the material world—a world that includes other human bodies 
and minds—cognition, like language itself, is intersubjective. Writing is always 
already intersubjectively engaged with others even when physically or temporal-
ly separated (a separation which writing crucially affords). While it is certainly 
true that writing allows us to engage with (cope with and shape) the non-human 
material world through cultural artifacts, it is also true that we write with our 
bodies, literally engaging with physical tools, writing instruments and surfaces, 
cobbling together writing routines and abilities we need from available mate-
rials and neural substrates for motor control, depth perception, and language 
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processing systems (Bazerman, 2013, p. 60). Such tools and surfaces, as activity 
theorists have long pointed out, “distribute” our cognition beyond the skull and 
among the instruments that help us expand our capacities. Yet our cognition 
appears to be shared among other bodies as well: in a womb, the mother-child 
heartbeats synchronize; in a room, interlocutors perceive each other’s bodies 
(motion, sound, smell, and sometimes touch or taste—e.g., in a kiss). When 
writing with others physically present (i.e., the phenomenon of “coworking” 
Pigg, 2014; Spinuzzi, 2011), this is literally true, but even when a writer is alone, 
others’ physical/sensory dimensions are present, and a writer’s body responds 
emotionally and physiologically (for example, with writing anxiety or avoid-
ance—see Reid, this volume). Thus, a full account of writing would acknowl-
edge that we think with our bodies: the nervous system is tied to the endocrine 
system, both in our heads and throughout our bodies, fusing the electrical and 
chemical. These electrochemical processes are tied in complex feedback loops 
to other systems: circulatory, muscular/skeletal, and so on. It would also extend 
beyond subpersonal processes to suprapersonal processes: the social and material 
participation of writers in the world, well beyond the skin barrier and backward 
and forward in time.
Summing up a substantial tradition of research on genre in NAWS, which 
is largely—though seldom acknowledged as such—underpinned by Alfred 
Schutz’s concept of typification (Schutz & Luckmann, 1989), Bazerman (2009) 
hypothesized that the language affordances of established textual forms position 
readers and writers in “defined problem spaces” that at once define the task as 
well as suggest tools for its completion (p. 136). Structured encounters with 
problem spaces defined by fields and professions refigure cognition. The neural 
legacies of these encounters are what we experience as “learning”: how to define 
problems or tasks as “problems” or “tasks” in the first place and how we acquire 
the ability to accept and reject potential solutions and means of working toward 
them. What “cognitive reconfiguration” in the Vygotskian tradition brings is a 
focus on development over time, but not simply development of writing abil-
ities (which has been the emphasis of IP cognitive psychology), but also the 
development of productive engagement—agentive participation—in a course, 
discipline, profession, or any social practice. What we emphasize here is that 
cognitive reconfiguration links brain and body and society—the biological and 
the cultural.
Negretti (2012) and Bazerman et al. (2013; 2014) have found evidence sug-
gesting that cognitive development can be scaffolded and traced in this way. It 
is important to note that these studies used students’ writing as a way to both 
harness and to measure metacognitive growth and that all three are longitudi-
nal studies that take time as a salient independent variable and examine lexical 
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and intertextual formations in students’ writing as data in its own right, not 
as a source of students’ claims about what they learned. That is, NAWS has 
historically looked at reflective writing as evidence that the student has become 
reflective, but these studies use writing as evidence of the development toward a 
future state—linguistic evidence of growth of which the student may not (or not 
yet) be fully aware in any explicit sense. By putting the onus on careful curric-
ular creation of problem spaces (see also Yancey, Robertson, & Taczak’s “critical 
incident” model, 2014, pp. 120-128), cognitive refiguration sees reflectiveness 
as less a pedagogical intention and more an experiential effect.
Teachers, administrators and researchers who would benefit from external 
support for such curricular reenvisioning can find it in national consensus doc-
uments like the Framework for Success in Postsecondary Writing (2011) and the 
Council of Writing Program Administrators’ Outcomes Statement for First-Year 
Composition (2014) both of which invite teaching and research faculty to con-
ceptualize writing as much more than an “in-head” phenomenon. The original 
Statement, first published in 1999, uses a distinctly command-and-control set of 
verbs to describe the optimal experience of composition students: “focus,” “use,” 
“respond,” “learn to,” “adopt,” “understand,” “control” (2001, pp. 323-325). 
The revision distinctly recharacterizes first-year composition as an opportuni-
ty-space in which students can “develop facility,” “gain experience,” “develop 
flexible strategies,” “explore . . . concepts,” “practice applying” and “developing 
knowledge . . . through practice” (for an account of these revisions, see Dryer et 
al., 2014, pp. 136-143).
Faculty across the disciplines benefit from workshops in which they can 
compare the original and revised versions of the Statement (starting with the 
first line, which pointedly replaces “skills” with “practices” (Dryer et al., 2014, 
p. 142). While engaging these changes leads to better, more informed conver-
sations about issues of curriculum design, we also observe that—likely because 
the new language frames writing in college as a matter of experiences with new 
practices and not as a set of skills to be learned—many faculty begin to recover 
a sense of the difficulties and pleasures involved in those experiences. Although 
“reflection” does not appear in the original Statement (an artifact of a moment 
in time before Yancey’s pioneering efforts (1998) began to be fully felt) we find 
it situated in the discussion of “Processes” in the 2014 version, where it is pro-
posed that students should “reflect on the development of composing practices 
and how those practices influence their work” (Dryer et al., p. 145). This is 
conscious—mindful—reflection on their experiences and practices, including 
changes in those routines, and the effects of these changes on a task and in a 
context. We see these changes as invitations to position the documents—and our 
teaching practices and traditions—in the phenomenological and neurophenom-
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enological tradition, where brain and body and society all write and are written.
In this light, dueling caricatures begin to dissolve: “critical awareness” versus 
“automaticity” (or “individual development” versus “social change”) is revealed 
to be a false dilemma. When we ask students to attend to problem spaces and 
the tools that seem available to bring to bear on them, we are working with their 
cognition and their sociality in a way that is construct-compatible with the un-
derstanding of “the present” that emerges from re-reading the phenomenologi-
cal tradition. If consciousness is distributed, both laterally among artifacts, our 
entire bodies, and other humans as well as longitudinally across the extended 
timeframe we perceive as “the now,” then the object or focus of any particular 
act of reflection becomes accordingly much more complex. Materiality, language 
affiliation, geography, race, class, embodiment, all become more available for 
consideration by NAWS and cognitive science alike. We look forward to the 
work ahead.
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